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JOSEPH

VINING

Generalization
in InterpretiveTheory
at large about the nature of legal interpreARE ARGUMENTS
THERE
tation,proceeding froman implicitpropositionthat interpretationis the same
phenomenon or experience whateveritssetting.An assumptionthatthereis one
phenomenon can be found in discussionsamong lawyersof interpretationand
in discussions among nonlawyersof legal interpretation-and as often in the
workof those who would deny thereis any significanceto theorizingabout interpretation,as of those who thinkpersuasion to a particulartheorywill have the
utmostconsequence forlaw and society.
Proceeding fromsuch a proposition,ratherthantowardit,raisesthe riskthat
distinctivefeaturesof legal interpretationmay be overlooked. If there is to be a
common understandingor theoryof interpretationit should not be built upon
of the evidence. As examples fromlaw appear more frequently
misinterpretation
in nonlegal settings,and nonlegal examples in discussionof law,distinctivefeatures of legal interpretationare the more easily overlooked. These featuresare
linked,but theymaybe roughlydivided and treatedunder fourheadings. Some
are more obvious than others.Some willbe more obvious to lawyersthan to nonlawyers,but it is an odd characteristicof currentdiscussionthatthe reversemay
also be true.'
Identificationof the Text
The firstof these featuresof legal interpretationhas to do withwhat
is oftencalled identifyinga text.Some, such as Steven Knapp and WalterBenn
of marksor sounds as a textinvolvesbeliefthat
Michaels,argue thatidentification
theyare a product of the intentionsof an agent (using "agent"in itsspecial philosophic sense rather than its common or legal sense).2 Others would identify
marks as a text through their relationshipto other marks in a somewhat freefloatingsystem.3But, forboth,thereseems to be assumed somethinglyingbefore
the reader,some determinateset of marks,some work,much as thereis an object
before one when one comes up to a piece of sculpture or listensto a piece of
music thathas a beginningand an end. That is not the situationin law.
Not thatone never comes in law to a sentence,a page, an opinion one has to
read and make sense of; of course one does, but thatis at the veryend of one's
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interpretivework,and perhaps thatis not even thenthe end. For in the repeated
runs at analysisof a situationmade possiblebya hierarchicalinstitutionof argument, one piece of writingwiththe meaning of which one has been wrestling,
the law of onejurisdictionor another,may
one sectionof a statuteor constitution,
be pulled away and replaced byanothersentence,anothersection,anotherbook.
When a practitionerasks, "What is the law here? How is thiscase to be analyzed?" no hand thrustsout a textand says,"Here, thisis whatwe are now going
to read and construe."Interpretationin law is, fromthe beginning,of the law.
The law is not to be equated withany particularset of marksor sounds nor even
with the meaning of any particularset of marks or sounds. And a small methodological consequence of this may be noted, that it would not be true to the
experience of interpretationin law to suppose that if one could achieve an
account of the identificationof and reading of one or anotherexample of a legal
text,one would then have in hand the problemof legal interpretation.
Cases do not come ready made, as teachersrepeatedlyemphasize to students
being graduallyintroducedto law. The initialquestion in practiceis of the form
"How ought thissituationto be thoughtabout under the law?"-after, of course,
the situationis delimitedas a situation-or "What ought to be done here under
the law?" In the course of analyzinga situation,one text,then another,may be
invoked and become the focus of attention.Startingas an "Occupational Health
and SafetyAct case," a death in a factorymayend as a case of corporatehomicide
under the general criminallaw. It may become a constitutionalcase as well as a
case of ordinarylaw. A car repossessioncase involvingallocation of money and
risk,seen immediatelyas a case of common law contractor a "UniformCommercial Code case" between "buyer"and "seller"or "debtor"and "creditor,"may in
addition become a "Federal Trade CommissionAct case" between "dealer" and
"customer,"involvingfederaladministrativeregulationof economic power. Or it
may become a case of civil wrong,a tortcase, ratherthan a contractcase, or a
securitieslaw case ratherthan a case of eithercontractor tort.5The applicability
of particulartexts,the focusingupon particularjudicialopinions,evolvesas analysisproceeds.
Recalling thisverybasic aspect of the practiceand experience of legal interpretationis not to introducewhatis sometimesthoughtmostdistinctiveabout the
world of law,the cleverlitigatorworkingagainstthatwhichis self-evident.There
is no self-evidentnatureof a case to be workedagainst.If a case comes to litigation
(as it does, indeed can, in onlya verytinypercentageof the situationsin whicha
legal question is put), it maybe given well-formedcontoursby the timeit getsto
an appellate court. Still,appellate judges, even appellate judges, must struggle
withitsnatureor characterization.Once an appellate opinion is written,of course
itappears the case alwayswas whatitcame to be. The interpretivequestion seems
to be how given textsare applied to particularfacts-even though those particular factsare remarked upon, and corralled offfromthe whole, in response to
2
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the proposed applicabilityof texts.And perhaps, once the appellate opinion is
written,the interpretivequestion not only seems to be that,but is. But then that
appellate opinion becomes merelyone more of the manyexpressionsof the law
thatlegal practitioners,startingagain withanother situation,mayor may not be
led to as theygo about consideringwhatthe meaningof the law is forthe situation
theyhave before them.
This evolutionaryqualityof the textto be interpreted,thatis encountered in
practice,is not simplya matterof canon formation-particulartextsor parts of
textsgraduallybecomingcentralin legal analysis,thefocusof discussion,through
hierarchicaldevices or otherwise.And it does not simplyreflectthe flightof any
text,once composed, intomere candidacyforattention(thoughthisis implicated:
ifauthorityconsistsin being paid attention-whichis also a formof praise-every
textis onlya candidate forattention,and itscapacityto evoke and maintainattention can never be assumed). Largely unexplored, thisis in law an analogue, pale
to explore, however
perhaps, of the formationof melodyin music. It is difficult
comfortablewithit thousands of practitionersappear to be in theirdaily work.
On it,on what a case is "about" and how it takes shape, any verydirectcomment
confrontsthe special problemslanguage imbued withthe staticposes fordiscussion of the dynamic.6But an eye can be kepton it,and an eye at leaston the actual
dynamismof legal thinkingmusthelp avoid a misleadinglyphotographicviewof
law as one in which a human being or human beings in general stare at a line
carved over a doorway,or at a book in the hand, or,to take an example sometimes
discussed in literarytheory,tracingsin the sand on a beach.7 Particulartexts
simplydo not step forwardwhen one asks, "What is the law here, how am I to
interpretthe law?" And even the universeof possiblyrelevanttextsalwayshas a
quiveringedge.
This factindeed, or, ifnot fact,thistruthof legal experience,is alwaysin the
background of "easy cases." A case easy in the hands of one may not be easy in
the hands of another,and the textthatrecordsthe dispositionof a case as an easy
case becomes just one more datum to be considered criticallyby a later analyst
looking at a new situation. Situations are not, in contemplationof law, each
unique in the sense Tolstoytook to be his own view of situationsin history;8but
situationsin contemplationof law are living,and thatalone bringsthem,and the
law,out fromunder the pictureof matchingup a rule to a set of facts.9

Types of Writings
Mentionof constitution,
statute,contract,opinion pointsto the second
problem in the thrusttoward generalityin discussions of interpretation.The
fruitfulpulling of experience in law toward experience in other fieldshas in it
the danger that those reflectingupon interpretationmay be temptedto induce
in Interpretive
Generalization
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theirsense of interpretationfromthe instancesof ittheysee, includinginstances
taking into account that much of the writingbeing
in law, withoutsufficiently
treatedin law maybe differentin kind and thatwritingsin law maydifferin kind
fromone another.What is perceived to be going on in workwitha contract,for
example, is not ground for any very definiteassertion about what is done in
workingwith a statute,and neitherthe handling of contractsnor of statutesis
more than a provocativesource of speculationabout the way a constitutionor a
set of opinions is read. Even among lawyers methodological conclusions are
sometimesdrawn after-and as a resultof-carelessly lumping various kinds of
legal textstogether.
In literaturethe language of textsis rarelynegotiatedand bargained over.
Particulartextsrarelybegin theirlife fashionedby more than one hand. There
is Beaumont and Fletcher,thereis the phenomenon of editing,there is the folk
ballad builtup throughsuccessivecontributionsof anonymoussingers,and there
is the writerwho writesor revisesa piece over a lifetime.But among the texts
literarycriticsdiscuss thereis not oftenone in the genesisof whichan individual
agrees to words he does not want or mean to say,throughsome exchange relationshipwithanother or as a resultof delegatingthe writingof it,or the words
of whichare the immediateoutcome of a processof assemblyin whichmanyhave
been independentlyat work. Nor is there oftenone withwords attributedto a
human being who may never have seen them, as to a voter or to a principal
"bound" bythe words of an agent. In law such textsare encounteredquite often,
and thisshould give pause to literarycriticsworkingwithlaw,and indeed to philosophers reaching out to law who are similarlyschooled in and accustomed to
text-focuseddiscussionin theirvarious fieldsof professionalinquiry.
The differencesto be found upon examinationof legal texts,type by type
and text by text,are pertinentto the large uncertaintiesof currentdiscussion.
In particular,lawyers'work withcontracts,statutes,the writingsof agents, and
the writingsof delegees does not as such point to the objectivityof language or
the irrelevanceof a statement'sorigin.To take onlycontractsand statutes:in the
constructionof manycontractsthe trueintentof the partiesis explicitlyexcluded
as a subjectof inquiry.This mayillustrateonlythatin manycases legal analysisis
not interpretationof meaning. Legal analysisof writingcan proceed rather in
what mightbe called a "tortmode." "Tort,"the law of civilwrong,has as itsconcern action and visitingthe consequences of action upon the actor,and a party
may be made to pay money (or money is shiftedfromone streamof wealth to
another)because she should have knowntheconsequence of insertingor allowing
someone actingforher to inserta markor a set of marksinto a machine called a
contract,regardlessof whatshe mighthave wantedthosemarksto express.'0The
historyof contractsis prominentin the teaching of contracts,in great degree
even now of disbecause the emergence of contractfromtortand the difficulty
or
intended
acts
unintended,and theircontinguishingbetweentortanalysis(of
4
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sequences) and contractanalysis(if the lattersuggestsinquiryinto the concrete
meanings of words) can be thus demonstratedand emphasized.
As for statutes,oftenand perhaps typicallythe originof a statute'swords in
committeeprocesses and bargained or strategicvotingforeclosesinquiryintothe
meaning of those who have touched it. Nonetheless,statutesin general seem to
be read, and not simplyas vectorproducts of the forcesthat made them in the
I But thisfact,thisevidenceof whatlawyersdo, is again not
legislativemachinery."
ground for conclusions (by lawyersor nonlawyers)about the way other kinds of
texts-opinions or administrativeregulationsor, a fortiori,nonlegal texts-are
or should be read. The reading of statutesfor"theirintent,"the payingof close
attentionto nuance and formin them,may be a necessaryand even desirable
formof self-delusion.Self-disciplineis stilldiscipline;a societyunder the rule of
law may allow itselfsome arbitraryfreedoms,play a trickor so on itself.But the
scope of such reading and the amount of such attentionare limitedbythe necessityand the desirabilityof self-delusion.'2It is not to be concluded thatbecause,
in law,textsthatare the productof machineryseem to be interpreted,therefore
interpretivetheoryshould pay attentiongenerallyto markson paper and sounds
thatare the productof processesuntouchedbymind.The oftennoticedtendency
in legal practice to pull back to and focus upon judicial opinions may be not
merely a result of the conventionsof legal education, evidence not merelyof
judge-centeredness or concentration upon litigation by sociologically uninformed lawyers,but a reflectionof a belief that opinions are more likelyto be
textsthatcan be read and can be the subjectof interpretation.

Distinctions Between
Reading and Writing
The thirdobservationto be made about generalizationin currentdiscussions of interpretationis that it may be overlooked how much lawyersreaders of legal texts-are also and (almost)at the same timewritersof legal texts.
In order and association this point could as well followdiscussionof the firstthe difficultyof establishingwhat the text is that one is to interpret-as the
second, the differencesin the kindsof writingsthatare attended to in law.'3
While there are sensitivegeneral accounts of the phenomenon of reading
thatshow the reading of a major literaryworkand the readingof law as a responsible reconstitutiveact,'4 the widespread image of law as givento the subjectwhetherin Babylonian bas-relief,Weberian sociology,or modern positivism'5_
has in itthe potentialto mislead,and mayexertthe greaterinfluenceas law ceases
its intellectualisolation and excites the curiosityof those who are not lawyers.
When one picks up a novel or poem the possibilityof a differencebetween
reading the novel or poem and writingit is an obvious startingpoint (not quite
in Interpretive
Generalization
Theory
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so obvious of course in music or drama, where performanceis necessaryto the
play or the song).'6 But in law a differencebetweenreading and writingis not an
obvious startingpointat all, notjust because one cannotpickup and hold in one's
hand a large and shiftingmass of legal textswithindefinableedges, but because
as a lawyerone reads for the purpose of oneself makinga statementof law for
whichone is responsible.Lawyersin theschoolsmake theirstatementsto students
or the world at large; in administrationor in whatis commonlydesignatedas the
practiceof law lawyersmake theirstatementsto clientor commissionor, acting
as judges or attorneysgeneral,to the world at large.'7The lawyerreads in order
to write,mustread fromthebeginningin an activeframeof mind and mustmake
a statementof-and for-the law.That statement,in turn,becomes part of what
is read fora timebyotherswho themselvesmustmake statementsof law. Insofar
as lawyerslistento any general account of interpretationthatignores theirconstant writingof the law, they are led astray; and insofar as those outside the
withan underprofessionseek to illuminetheirown experienceof interpretation
standingof legal interpretationas passive or static,theyare led astray.

Identificationof the Author
of identifyingthe text,
How much do all these points-the difficulty
the varietyof texts,the joinder of writingwith reading-fold into and derive
fromthatmostsignal featureof legal discourse,thatwritersof legal textsdo not
speak forthemselves?Perhaps thisis a fourthpoint; perhaps itis not (but itis not
the same as the appearance in law of delegated writing).Certainlyit should not
be overlooked when looking to law.
To put it conciselythough paradoxically,if writersof legal texts(again, not
includingcontracts,whichmaynot be speech) were to speak forthemselves,they
would speak withoutauthority.They speak forthelaw or foran entity-the court,
the agency,the legislature-thatin turnspeaks forthe law,withthe possible exception of the legislature,and even then thereis an ostensiblespeaking for,forthe
sensibilitymay want to
"sovereign"if not "the law." The late-twentieth-century
ignore these others, these authors beyond, as passe figments,but if one does
ignore them one does so at the price of deprivingspeech of authority.
It is furthertrue that a speaker's speaking for an entity-or for the law-is
never a given, but is a question always alive, to be determinedby the listener.
Though a situationmay be disposed of forthe moment,as if the speaker spoke
the law, the question whetherthe speaker was authorized so to dispose of that
situation may be examined whenever the dispositionis examined; there is no
foreclosingof the question: itis posed and answered in a nonfinalwayagain and
again as timegoes on.
From this general observation legislators again may possibly have to be
6
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excepted (other than withrespectto the narrowrange of utterancesthatmaybe
disregarded on constitutionalgrounds). But if the legislatoris an exception,that
very fact is part of the reason listenersare pressed back to the utterancesof
judges-that blank interposition,that wall between the listenerand the author
whom the listeneris seekingto hear,whicha legislativeclaim alwaysto speak for
the sovereignpresents.Of course the legislaturecould claim to be not agent but
itselfsovereign,but thatis not the assertionthatis made. It is, possibly,an assertionthatneverhas been made whereauthorityhas been claimedand law invoked.

Convergences
Emphasizing these featuresof the experience of legal interpretation
does not proceed fromor inevitablytowardsome formof nominalism.Consider
again that central term in currentdiscussion,intent.Preciselybecause theyare
writerslawyersmightbe expected to be especiallysensitiveto the complexities
of intent.That theyare writersis what mighthold them back fromembracing
propositions about authorial intent made in arguments either for or against
or foritsexistenceor importanceto interpretation-thisratherthan philistinism
eignness in the worktheydo.
Legal writingis oftennot expressive.Veryoftenit is manipulativeonly.But
when it is expressiveand there is true effortto make a statementof law, participation in it is almost as fineas participationin any kind of writing.The writerof
a poem does not say what the poem means byreferenceto his conscious intentin
the writingof it,because he cannot; and in adding one more voice to those who
have made thispoint I mayinviteforcompanythenot insubstantialnumberwho,
though theymaynot considerthemselvespoets,have been moved now and again
to writea poem. If the poet could so explain himself,he mightthen have written
Much about a poem can in a real sense be explained to the writerof
differently.
itwithout(as we say) puttingwordsintohis mouth.Listeningto anotherexpound
his poem, the poet, if he is to respond at all, reflectsnot on the memoryof his
conscious thoughtbut on whyhe stopped his daily business to write(daily business includingtakinga walkor staringat hisdesk) and, ifthe poem did not appear
in full bloom, on how and whyhe labored over it as he did. The experience of
reaching-one always reaches in a poem-includes the experience of tryingto
get lines and words right.And, it mustbe said, the writerof legal prose does the
same.
He writes,and looks. The thrustof thisseems inconsistentwith that,the
emphasis withinthispassage is misleading,thisor thatword is notjust (the very
metaphorjust is a legal one). The writertriesto get the word, passage, or stateIf he does notabandon
mentmore satisfactory,
or,in some rare cases, satisfactory.
it forreasons of timeor fatigue,it mayeventuallylock into place, not be improvin Interpretive
Generalization
Theory
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able without hurting it in some (other) way. But, as he works, molding and
rewriting,he cannot say whathe is doing. If he could the labor would be over. It
willbe allowed, and bythose who dwell upon the writingof a paragraph of prose
as well as those who ventureto writepoetry,thatin the placing of words,and in
all that touches upon the aestheticof echo and multiplereference,much selfconsciousness or consciousness of what one is doing leads away fromthe living
and resonant and towardthe rote and the dead. But the same is true in the first
drawingof a word fromthe mind,when,as the sayingis,a word comes to mind.'8
Intentionsare veiled, theyare being expressed in the work,and writeras well as
reader looks to the workas evidence. (The lawyerespeciallyis in the positionof
having readers: otherwritersmaybe able to conceive of writingwithoutreaders
talkingto themabout it,but notlawyers,who are thereforeconstantlyconfronted
withthe question of theirown intent.)
And whatthe reader does, the close reader,is seek ultimatelyto identifywith
the writerwho is thus reachingand trying.If such resonance and such identification turnout to be possible,the writingis good, a carrierof meaning. Hermes
is withoutclothes,save forhis travelinghat,because he assumes such a multitude
of forms.

Advantages of Particularity
There are thus generalitiesto be achieved. It needs merelyto be noted
thatwhat is criticalin the achievingof themis to see fromthe inside those expehas itslargeruses too. An attenriences thatare to be merged. But particularity
tiveunderstandingof law mightbe helpfulin savingpractitionersin other fields
frommisdirection.Take as an example the fieldcurrentlybeing mostvigorously
developed-with what is widelythoughtto be the most significantpotentialfor
large practicalchanges in waysof life-the design and programmingof sophisticatedcomputers.
Workon equipping computersto process human language draws on linguistics,whichin one of itsprominentcurrentformsdistinguisheswhatare proposed
as rules for the constructionof sentences,"syntax,"from"semantics,"whichhas
to do withthe meaningof the constructedsentences.One hears itsaid thatsyntax
determines what constitutesa legal sentence of human language, and there is
hope for machine programsthatwill rejectillegalsentences-all withoutregard
to meaning.'9
The termslegal and illegalin thissettingshould be a littlewarning,a cause
forcaution. Legal and illegalare powerfuland attractiveterms,used to make the
governingdistinctionbetween syntaxand semanticsmore vividlyplausible, but
also quite possiblydrawn upon for the substanceof the distinctionitself.There
is somethingof the same in VirginiaWoolf'sreferenceto "law" in her comment
8
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in ThreeGuineas,"The Church being a spiritualprofessionhas to give spiritual
and not merelyhistoricalreasons for its actions; it has to consult the mind, not
the law."20If itshould come to be understoodthatconsultingthe law is consulting
the mind, and thatwhat is legal or illegal is not determinablewithoutan inquiry
into meaning,the workof machinedesignersand programmersand speculation
upon the possibilitiesof futurehuman organizationbased upon theircontributions would not be confuted; but legal practiceand thoughtwould no longer be
a source or prop of work in these fields.Its powerfulattractionsand validations
would be withdrawn.If machine designers are then leftwitha notion of rules,
divorced frommeaning and mind,thatcan be connectedonlyto natural science
given the
and the laws and rules thereof,and if thisshould prove unsatisfactory
source and characterof a scientificlaw,theymayjust possiblybe freedto proceed
in new directions,and willat leastbe somewhatbetterprotectedfromelaboration
thatin the end proves disappointingand discouraging,if not indeed dangerous
as it is absorbed into the formsand methodsof human organization.

Prospects
So too explorers fromthe literaryand linguisticdisciplineswho sail
into law may discover somethingof help to them in theirown thinking,if they
stayfor a time-if theydo not returntoo quicklywiththe news thatgreat numbers of apparentlyintelligentpeople are reading for meaning marks on paper
thatno one means, or marksthatare the productof forcesnot associated in any
waywithmind. If theycome to law,as some literarycriticsdo, bringingwiththem
beliefthatthereis an ineradicableconnectionbetweenthe spoken and a speaker,
they may help lessen somewhat the pressure lawyershave felt so long from
pushing against the long depersonalizingthrustof the modern age. Their presence may even make it more difficultfor lawyersto mislead themselves,as they
do, when talk turnsto the Rule of Law and (tryingto express what it is to live in
a world in which no one includingthe legal analystis above or outside the law)
theyend somewhatlike the tragicAntigone,projectingan image of law as a set
of rules outside,a gridthat,could you onlytap itwithyourfingernail,would give
out a hard metallicring.Lawyersmayneed nonlawyersto help themturnto what
theyactuallydo when under the Rule of Law theyworkresponsiblywithcommon
and public texts.
Regardless of what those who are now discoveringlaw leave behind, on their
returnto theirown disciplinestheymayfinditmore difficult
to collapse meaning
and the speakingvoice eitherintothe intentof an authorbound to timeand place
or into one or another formof systemor process,a language system,the reasons
of history.They may find that theyare encouraged, themselves,to maintain a
connection between words and intention,to keep words a gatewayto intention
in Interpretive
Generalization
Theory
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even forthe fashionerof them.The smallspace withinthe skullof the individual
is not the only retreatfrom the emptyreaches of systemand process, if it is a
retreatat all. Nothing rules out another alternativea priori; lawyerscannot forsake the personal and the concretefor the impersonalobjectivityof system,but
Aftera sojourn listeningto lawyersand
theydo not stop withmere particularity.
attendingto what lawyersactuallydo, some at least may be less uncomfortable
than before withan occasional thoughtof a person speaking who is not an individual, an occasional thoughteven of a transcendentalintention,less uncomfortable too with the possibilityof conceivingtheirown activityas having,like law,
somethingof a moralthrusttowardthe futureand thewhole and towardactionof conceivingwritingand speaking, perhaps in general, as a discoveryof what
one did not knowwas in one, withotherstakingit up to place it againstthe whole
and using it to make theirown statements,whichare then again subjectto criticism against the whole by anyone who is also in responsiblecontact withwhat
there is to be expressed.

Notes
Rudolf Arnheim, Alton L. Becker,John H. D'Arms, Kenneth J. Dewoskin, Bruce
Mannheim, JenniferNedelsky,Robert Post, Philip Soper, James Boyd White, and
ChristinaB. Whitmanhave made helpfulcommentson the manuscript.
1. The contributionsand footnotereferencesin "InterpretationSymposium,"Southern
CaliforniaLaw Review58 (1985): 1-725, providea contemporarysurveyof discussion
of legal interpretationother than in work in cognitivescience and artificialintelligence. A seriesof papers byStevenKnapp and WalterBenn Michaelsoffersan elegant
entree to discussion among literarycriticsof interpretationgenerally.See "Against
Theory,"CriticalInquiry8 (1982): 723-42; "A Reply to Our Critics,"CriticalInquiry9
(1983): 790-800; "A Replyto Richard Rorty:What Is Pragmatism?"CriticalInquiry11
(1985): 466-73; "Against Theory 2: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction,"Critical
Inquiry14 (1987): 49-68. Knapp's and Michaels's contributionsbetween 1982 and
1985 are collectedin convenientformtogetherwithrelatedpapers byothersin W.J.T.
Mitchell, ed., Against Theory:LiteraryStudies and the New Pragmatism (Chicago, 1985).

Withrespectto artificialintelligenceand itspossible applicationto computerreading
Intellior writingof statementsof law, see Anne von der Lieth Gardner,An Artificial

gence Approach to Legal Reasoning (Cambridge, Mass., 1987); Herbert Simon, The Sciences of theArtificial,2nd ed. (Cambridge,Mass., 1982), 130-59.

16, 140-4 1.
2. Knapp and Michaels,NewPragmatism,
freefloatingbecause much contemporaryreflec3. A textis to be thoughtonlysomewhat
tion on the possible objectivityof language, outside law,is reluctantto grantthatthe
meaning of a word or a sentence in a language is an empiricalmatter.E.g., Stanley
Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? A Book ofEssays (Cambridge, 1976), 1-43.

4. This is quite aside fromdifferencesin kindsof legal texts,to be noted below,but not
to say that examples of texts-such as the inheritancestatutein Riggsv. Palmer(see

10
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5.

6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously[Cambridge, Mass., 1978]), or the opinion in
Rylands v. Fletcher(liability without fault in tort; see A. W. Brian Simpson, "Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher,"Journal of
not examined closely, or that it is not profitable
Legal Studies 13 [1984]: 209-64)-are
to do so.
Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,673 F. 2nd 1008 (9th Cir., 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 999 (1982); People ofIllinois v. Film RecoverySystems,Inc., no. 8311091,
Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. (1985).
My own comments may be found in Joseph Vining, Legal Identity(New Haven, 1978),
93, 94, 119-20, 134; The Authoritativeand theAuthoritarian(Chicago, 1986; revised ed.,
1988), 21-22, 74, 176, 217-18, 221.
E.g., Knapp and Michaels, in Mitchell, New Pragmatism,19.
I think of the epilogue to Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Rosemary Edmunds, 2
vols. (Baltimore, Md., 1976), 2:1339-1444.
Nonlawyers are sometimes astonished to find this true even in matters involving business: when one is engaged in one's affairs and sells an orange grove, and, under the
law of contract, engages to harvest and sell the oranges for the buyer of the tract, the
securities laws may become relevant. Though what one has in one's hands are a propertydeed and a contract, and though no gilt-edged paper changes hands, the situation
one has brought about may eventually be analyzed in "totality,""in truth," "substance,"
"reality"-the words are used-as the "selling of a security." See Securitiesand Exchange
Commissionv. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Securitiesand Exchange Commissionv.
Glen Arden Commodities,Inc., 368 F. Supp. 1386 (E.D. N.Y., 1974), aff'd sub nom. Glen
Arden Commodities,Inc. v. Costantino,493 F. 2nd 1027 (2nd Cir., 1974).
Knapp and Michaels are aware of this. See "Against Theory 2," 63. The involvement
of an agent ("agent" in its legal rather than philosophic sense) extends and complicates
such analysis.
The "tort mode" is not really applicable to legislation. Unlike contracting parties' acts,
the consequences of legislators' acts are not visited upon legislators themselves but
upon others and upon the future of the world; nor can the consequences accorded
legislators' acts be reduced to reversible shifts in money flows.
Further discussion of this aspect of the legislative text may be found in Vining, Authoritativeand Authoritarian,chaps. 9, 10, and 11.
Perhaps not all should be called texts. Some, as noted, may not be speech or treated
as speech.
See James Boyd White, When WordsLose TheirMeaning: Constitutionsand Reconstitutions
ofLanguage, Character,and Community(Chicago, 1984).
See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber(Stanford, Calif., 1983), 11, 22, 28, 45, 53,
73, 89-9 1; Joseph Raz, The AuthorityofLaw (Oxford, 1983).
E.g., Knapp and Michaels, in Mitchell, New Pragmatism,103. Art invites, but does want
to daunt. Restating into life what is heard-reviving and building-it nonetheless
wants a circle woven round it thrice: to deny to its readers, through closure, the possibilityof doing what it has just demonstrated the possibility of doing.
The word clientmay not convey the spread of the audiences to whom a lawyer speaks
in ordinary practice. The client is often an institution, or an agency of government.
Others beyond the client may be expected to rely upon an opinion letter. In fact, in
some circumstances an opinion letter may be mandated by statute.
Special considerations, and rule formulations of them, apply to lawyers' statements to ajudge in litigation.
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18. Owen Barfield's PoeticDiction: A Studyin Meaning, 2nd ed. with afterword (Middletown,
Conn., 1972), is in part a meditation, indeed a lawyer's meditation, on the place of
conscious thought in writing and speaking.
The firstword that comes to mind is of course not necessarily the last. The critical
faculties are there to meet it. But the critical faculties can be engaged only if there is
something for them to be engaged upon.
19. E.g., Michael A. Arbib, In Search of thePerson: Philosophical Explorationsin CognitiveScience (Amherst, Mass., 1985), 32; "English as a Computer Language," The Economist,4
April 1987, 84-85.
20. Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas (New York, 1963), 125.
21. Since writing the above, I find Roy Harris making a similar point in stronger fashion
in The Language Machine (Ithaca, N.Y., 1987), particularly at 136-37, using inter alia
A. M. Turing's reference to "authority" in his "Computing Machinery and Intelligence" (1950) in Alan Ross Anderson, ed., Minds and Machines (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.,
1964), 8.
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